ECOSEL is a voluntary market framework for private provision of forest ecosystem services. 4
Introduction 20
The objective of this paper is to use experimental economics to inform the design of ECOSEL, a 21 voluntary market framework (Tóth et al. 2010 ) for forest ecosystem services. We show that some of the 22 design variables of the mechanism can be streamlined to maximize social surplus or forest landowner 23 revenues, or both. In conducting the economic experiments to test the design of the market mechanism, 24 we guided by the real-world context of ECOSEL. In other words, we try to preserve as much realism 25 about the design parameters of ECOSEL as possible without compromising the experimental control. As 26 a consequence, the experimental results are clearly applicable to ECOSEL, but they can also be used more 27 generally in the context of voluntary provision of public goods. This study is the first experimental 28 analysis of a voluntary funding mechanism for public goods where multiple, competing bundles of goods 29 are offered and the bidders hold different private values with respect to these bundles. 30
Forests provide a suite of ecosystem services to the public, and the goal of ECOSEL is to efficiently 31 increase their provision. Clean air, water, carbon sequestration, recreational opportunities, wildlife habitat 32 or even a place for spiritual recharge are some of the many benefits of forests. It is difficult to capture the 33 monetary value of these benefits as they are often characterized by various degrees of non-excludability 34
and non-rivalry (e.g., Pagiola et al. 2004, p 10) . The owner of a forest that provides an expansive forest 35 view would have difficulties in excluding someone else from enjoying the scenery even if the individual 36 did not pay for the privilege; hence the non-excludability. Similarly, enjoying a forest's scenery doesn't 37 reduce its supply. Others can still enjoy the benefits regardless of how many enjoyed these benefits 38 before; hence the non-rivalry. A well-known consequence of these properties of public goods is their 39 under-provision in conventional markets (Pagiola et al. 2002) . The inability to monetize the value of 40 ecosystem services from forestlands can drive premature timber extraction or the conversion of land to 41 real estate development. 42
Markets provide an incentive for forest landowners to maximize return on their investments. Land 43 conversions often compromise ecosystem functions thereby diminishing public goods. In the Pacific 44
Coast Region of the United States alone, 15,000-20,000 ha of non-federal forestland have been lost to 45 5 i.e., the costs that would have to be met for an alternative to be economically acceptable for the 101 landowner, to be as low as possible. Lower prices are more likely to attract bidders. 102
In the initial phase of an ECOSEL game, a multi-objective mathematical programming model of form what amounts are already being provided by regulation. It is also important to emphasize that the decision 111 variables in program p are discrete and refer to the timing of 0-1 management decisions such as whether 112 to cut a stand or not, or whether to decommission a road or not. The discrete nature of these decisions 113 makes the monitoring of the production of ecosystem services fairly straightforward and inexpensive. 114
While we note that ECOSEL can be used to capture more subtle changes in forest management such as 115 thinning intensity or controlling species composition, there is plenty of evidence in the literature (Barbieri 116 and Malueg 2008, Menezes et al. 2001 ) that public goods of only the discrete type have a reasonable 117 chance to lead to efficient provision in subscription games. In practical terms, offering continuous public 118 goods such as incremental changes in management in a game like ECOSEL might increase the modeling 119 and monitoring expenses, which are parts of what is collectively called transaction costs, to an extent that 120 would render the game unattractive to sellers or buyers, or both. The reader is referred to Tóth et al. 121 (2006) , Tóth and McDill (2009) or to Tóth et al. (2010) for examples on how exactly specific ecosystem 122 services, such as carbon sequestration or wildlife habitat, can be captured in model p . 123
The solution to program p in the objective space is a finite set of Pareto-efficient bundles of 124 ecosystem and commodity services. In the corresponding decision space, the solution is a set of 125 management plans defined by the optimal values of vector
x . For convenience, we refer to a specific 126 6 management plan that is used in an ECOSEL game as an alternative or option. The projected combination 127 of ecosystem services associated with an alternative is called a bundle. Since there is a one-on-one 128 correspondence between alternatives and bundles, we use these terms interchangeably. Figure 1 depicts 129 an actual set of Pareto-efficient management plans that were derived for Pack Forest, Washington as an 130 example. Here, the ecosystem services to be sold are old-forest habitat area and carbon sequestration. The 131 opportunity costs are defined as forgone timber revenues. Foregone timber revenue provides the 132 appropriate measure of opportunity costs of a management plan for a forest which is managed primarily 133 for timber revenues. For non-industrial forest landowners who have other ownership objectives (Butler 134 2008, Lin 2010), the opportunity costs could be defined differently; for example as the minimum 135 compensation to forego development revenues. In general, given the voluntary nature of ECOSEL, the 136 definition of opportunity cost will depend on the landowner who is putting their forest management up for 137
bidding. 138
We note that since problem p is a discrete optimization problem, solutions can only be found using 139 specialized algorithms due to the lack of convexity. To derive the Pareto set in Figure 1 problem p is an opportunity cost function, each solution (or equivalently: a management plan) has an 144 associated cost in ECOSEL. In the proposed bidding process these costs serve as the basis for the 145 threshold costs. The bidding process is open to the public whose bids are aggregated by the mechanism 146 based on the notion of non-rivalry. 147
To formalize the ECOSEL game, we let I denote the set of bundles of public goods, i.e., ecosystem 148 services, that are available for bidding, and we let K denote the set of potential bidders. Subscripts i and j 149 index set I and k indexes set K. Each potential bidder kK  is assumed to have a value, k i v associated 150 with each bundle iI  . This value is known to the individual but is not known by the other bidders.
151
Finally, let the net social benefit or social surplus associated with bundle i will be the sum of the resulting net 156 benefits to the bidders and the net benefits to the seller :
. Note that social surplus only depends on the values that the players assign to the winning 158 scenario and on the associated threshold cost but not on the value of the bids. We regard bundle i efficient 159 if, of all the bundles that are available for bidding, it is bundle i that maximizes i SS :
 . An outcome of ECOSEL is efficient if the bundle that wins in the 161 game is also the one that maximizes social surplus. 162
Classification of ECOSEL and Literature Review: 163
ECOSEL can be viewed as a competitive, multidimensional, multi-good voluntary public goods 164 subscription game with incomplete information, a predefined set of provision points (threshold costs) and 165 refundable contributions (Admati and Perry 1991) . Unlike most previously considered subscription 166 games, ECOSEL can be competitive in that the players might have very different values with respect to 167 the management plans offered and the resulting public goods (preference heterogeneity or asymmetry). 168
Thus, a particular outcome of the game might be preferred by some, but not necessarily by all players. For 169 example, a winning management plan that significantly reduces timber production in a forest might be a 170 great outcome for a conservation organization or for recreational users, and these groups may even 171 cooperatively bid to assure the outcome. In contrast, a local sawmill whose operational viability depends 172 on the raw materials that would come out of the forest will unlikely favor this outcome. The competitive 173 nature of the ECOSEL game, as well as the fact that the mechanism is intended to generate revenues 174 implies that the mechanism is also akin to auctions. For that reason, we refer to specific instances of the 175 ECOSEL game as auctions. While private goods from forests such as timber are routinely sold in auctions 176 and such auctions have been studied extensively (e.g., Athey et al., 2011, Stone and Rideout 1997) , we 8 propose an auction mechanism for forest public goods. Unlike conventional auctions, however, ECOSEL 178 is a multi-good auction because multiple, mutually-exclusive alternatives are offered for simultaneous 179 bidding, and multiple bidders can win if the sum of their bids most exceeds the reserve price. The 180 alternatives are also multidimensional in that they lead to bundles of different outputs rather than single 181 products. In the forest management context, one plan could lead to more carbon sequestration and more 182 old-forest habitat production but to less timber revenues than another plan. Depending on their 183 preferences, bidders weigh the tradeoffs as they bid. ECOSEL is a game of incomplete information 184 because, at the outset, the players don't know about each other's preferences with respect to the goods 185 offered. Lastly, ECOSEL is intended to attract the sellers of ecosystem services by promising the 186 possibility of a profit when the sum of bids exceeds the threshold costs. 187
While the theoretical properties of complete-information subscription games have been studied (e.g., probability that a good is not provided in cases when it is efficient. However, Menezes et al. (2001) 197 established that subscription games, where contributions are refunded if a threshold is not met, are 198 superior in efficiency to games where no refunds are allowed. Also, Barbieri and Malueg (2008) showed 199 that subscription games can act as profit-maximizing selling mechanisms over all incentive-compatible 200 selling mechanisms, which is a very important result for ECOSEL (and reinforces the auction 201 interpretation of an ECOSEL process). 202
Lastly, evidence from public economics suggests that allowing the players to voluntarily disclose or 203 conceal their identity in subscription games increases the likelihood of a successful outcome. -Warm-204 glow‖ effects (Andreoni 1990 ), moral motivation (Brekke et al. 2002) , social norms (Levy-Garboua et al. properties of such games. While Bagnoli and McKee (1991) found strong evidence that the subscription 210 games result in efficient public good provisions, their results were challenged by Mysker et al. (1996) . List 2008) make generalizations regarding the efficiency of the mechanism we aim to study difficult. The 215 preponderance of evidence suggests that certain design features of these games are clearly conducive to 216 more bidding. These include the presence of discrete thresholds in contributions (Isaac et al. 1989 , 217 services are critical for answering the first, this paper focuses exclusively on the second question. We 228
seek to find a design for the ECOSEL game which has the best potential to increase social welfare in 229 terms of increased provision of forest ecosystem services to society. We want ECOSEL to be successful 230 in selecting and funding management plans that are projected to yield as much net social benefits as 231 possible. A second, not necessarily conflicting, goal is to select a design that maximizes seller profit. 232
Using experimental economics methods, we consider the effects of bidder communication, the number of 233 alternatives presented, and threshold cost disclosure. We chose these factors because neither economic 234 theory nor experimental economics provide sufficient guidance for the context of a multi-unit public good 235 subscription game of incomplete information. 236
The number of bundles of ecosystem services presented for bidding might affect the performance of 237 the mechanism. Fewer alternatives might limit flexibility so that players are unsatisfied with the choices 238 offered. A large number of bundles on the other hand may prove to be too difficult for the subjects to 239 analyze and might also result in scattered bids preventing convergence towards a potentially successful 240 outcome (cf., Bagnoli et al. 1992) . 241
Second, it is not clear if threshold costs should be disclosed to the bidders, or if it should be kept 242 hidden and the players notified only if a particular threshold cost has been met. A coordinated group of 243 bidders would have no difficulty closely bracketing the true threshold cost with repeated contribution 244 rounds however such coordination is not guaranteed ex ante. We expect the coordination problem, a 245 situation in which the players must make mutually consistent decisions to realize mutually beneficial 246 outcomes, to be stronger if threshold costs are not disclosed as some bidding might be spent on threshold 247 cost discovery rather than on tacit or explicit bidder cooperation. Previous theoretical (Nitzan and contributions under threshold uncertainty may be higher if the value of the public good that is presented 252 for bidding is sufficiently high. The reasoning behind this result is that an individual bidder is likely to 253 contribute if they feel that they are a pivotal contributor. McBride (2006) shows that there exists a 254 positive relationship between threshold uncertainty and the probability that one's contribution is pivotal 255 when the value of the public good is sufficiently high, with the direction of the relationship reversed when 256 the value of the public good is low. In a recent experimental test of his prediction, McBride (2010) finds 257 some support for the hypothesis, although his results are based on a game with no refund and with a 258 single public good project financed by all-or-nothing contributions. 259
Finally, we wish to explore the impact of subject communication on the auction's efficiency and on It is important to point out that laboratory tests are just one of the many procedures needed before a 268 mechanism like ECOSEL can be implemented. A legal framework is currently under development to 269 ensure that both the bidders and the sellers would enter into a binding contract. A third-party organization, 270 e.g., a land trust, would monitor seller actions and ensure compliance with the winning management plan 271 in cases where the services are being provided. Insurance arrangements might also be necessary for the 272 landowner to hedge against unforeseen natural calamities and market uncertainties. Finally, stated 273 preference surveys and qualitative focus group analyses may inform both the design of the mechanism 274 and identify the set of ecosystem services that are of greatest interest to potential bidders in particular 275 locations. While some of these investigations have been completed and others are underway, these 276 analyses are beyond the scope of this paper. The laboratory tests informing the design of the ECOSEL 277 mechanism are the focus of this study. In this paper, we describe the experimental procedures and the 278 empirical results used to derive the design recommendations. 279
280
Methods 281
Experimental procedures are described in four steps. We start with an account of the motivation 282 behind and the generation of the five alternative forest management plans that were used to create the 283 public goods bundles presented in the experimental auctions. Second, we define the hypotheses about the 284 three design variables that were tested: threshold cost disclosure, bidder communication and the number 285 of alternatives offered. Experimental design is third, followed by a description of the econometric model 286
that was used to test the hypotheses. 287 288
Management Plans: 289
For our laboratory tests, we selected five 45-year management plants for the University of 290
Washington's 1,700 ha Pack Forest ( Fig. 1 and 2) . The five plans, A-E, differ in their projected outcomes 291 with respect to ecosystem services and the associated opportunity costs and represent a diverse range of 292 contrasting but Pareto-efficient combinations of discounted net timber revenues, carbon sequestration, 293 and old forest habitat production. The latter two services, as well as the timber revenue objective, were 294 chosen based on stakeholder input. All three outputs were imbedded in a mathematical program as 295 functions of binary harvesting decisions that were to be applied to each of the 186 stands of the forest 296 over nine 5-year long planning periods. The detailed formulation of the mathematical model is given in Washington to maintain old-growth set-asides beyond what is required by law (i.e., seed capital). Bundles 302 B-E are increasingly conservation oriented; they are projected to lead to increasing amounts of old forest 303 habitat or carbon sequestration, or both at the expense of timber revenues. If a real auction was to take 304 place at Pack Forest and none of the 5 bundles succeeded, Bundle A would be the most likely but not a 305 certain outcome. For example, changes in prices, market demand and other factors may in the future make 306 other options that are not necessarily known at the time of the auction, more profitable for the landowner. 307
The uncertainty of future conditions suggests the threshold cost of Bundle A would be greater than zero in 308 a real auction because there is an opportunity cost associated with giving up flexibility to depart from 309
Bundle A as needed to maximize revenues. The threshold cost of Bundle A can be viewed as a 310 -handcuff‖ fee for the landowner. 311 13 Each of the five plans represents one silvicultural pathway comprising of a sequence of nine yes-or-312 no harvest decisions for each stand. They all meet the minimum standards of sustainability (Ettl 2010): 313 the minimum, area-weighted average age of the forest at the end of the planning horizon exceeds the 314 average initial age, the maximum harvest opening size never exceeds 40.47 ha in any of the nine planning 315 periods (Washington State regulations dictate a 48.56 ha limit), and harvest volume fluctuations between 316 adjacent periods are bounded between 90 and 120%. The five management plans were presented in the 317 experimental auctions as abstract trade-offs (not forest management scenarios) with relative, rescaled 318 threshold costs so that the bidding process would not be affected by the preferences of bidders for actual 319 ecosystem services. We emphasize that this study is about mechanism design and not about people's 320 preferences with respect to ecosystem services. By choosing a realistic set of management alternatives to 321 build the abstract public goods, we preserve the general nature of tradeoffs between costs and the various 322 dimensions of ecosystem services. 323 324
Hypotheses: 325
We explore the properties of our subscription game with varying numbers of subjects in each auction 326 and under heterogeneous subject endowments and heterogeneous subject preferences with the preferences 327 being private information (i.e. known only to the bidder). These -nuisance‖ parameters intend to mimic 328 real ECOSEL games where player pools, player preferences and purchasing power are beyond the 329 auctioneer's control (although we control for their impact in our econometric analysis). On the basis of 330 existing theoretical and experimental literature, we formulate the following hypotheses regarding the 331 impact of the three design variables on auction efficiency and seller profit. 332
Number of bundles presented: 333
H1E: Under preference heterogeneity, we expect coordination problems to be present, and, 334 therefore, we hypothesize that the higher the number of bundles offered, the greater the 335 coordination problem, and, in turn, the lower the economic efficiency of the auction. 336 H1R: For similar reasons, we expect that higher number of bundles leads to lower seller 337 revenues. 338 14 2. Threshold cost disclosure: 339 H2E: We expect that the impact of threshold cost disclosure depends on the perceived value of 340 the public good presented to the bidders. In particular, we expect threshold uncertainty to 341 lead to lower economic efficiency when the value of public goods is low but to higher 342 efficiency when it is high. To test the above hypotheses, we assigned binary treatment variables to the three design features. The 357 number of bundles was set to be either -high‖, where the abstract versions of all the 5 bundles from Pack 358
Forests were used for bidding (Bundles A-E) or -low‖, where only 3, Bundles B, C, and E were used 359 ( Fig. 1) . We let the binary variable that represents the number of bundles to take the value of 1 if three 360 bundles are offered and 0 otherwise. We treated the threshold cost disclosure and subject communication 361 policies also as yes-or-no design strategies. The threshold cost disclosure variable was set to 1 when the 362 cost was disclosed, 0 otherwise, and the communication variable was set to 1 when communication 363 among the subjects was allowed and 0 otherwise. This implies 8 auction types to be tested in a full 364 factorial design. We used the following orthogonal fractional factorial design with 4 auction types: T1 365 15 (No communication, 3 bundles offered, threshold costs disclosed), T2 (No communication, 5 bundles 366 offered, threshold costs not disclosed), T3 (Communication allowed, 3 bundles, threshold costs not 367 disclosed), and T4 (Communication allowed, 5 bundles, threshold costs disclosed). Eight replications 368 were carried out for each of the four auction types, each with a different subject pool. Orthogonal 369 fractional factorial design, a standard choice in natural and social science fields (e.g., Fannin et al. 1981) , 370 allows the number of auction types that need to be tested to be cut by half without compromising the 371 experimenter's ability to estimate the effects of the three factors on social surplus and seller revenues. The 372 four auction types (T1, T2, T3 and T4) were assigned to four physical locations (classrooms) in a Latin 373 squares design (Table 1) , where each cell represents a single experimental auction. Economic efficiency 374 (ranging from 0 in the case of no public good provided to 1 if the efficient bundle of public goods is 375 provided) and seller profit associated in those auctions are the outcomes of interest. 376
As a next step, we created groups of bidders (subjects) to participate in the experimental auctions. We 377 assigned predefined preferences for public goods and experimental monetary endowments to the subjects 378 to use for bidding. We explored the properties of our subscription game with varying numbers of subjects 379 in each auction and under heterogeneous subject endowments and heterogeneous subject preferences with 380 the preferences being private information (i.e. known only to the bidder). By allowing these parameters to 381 vary across the experimental auctions, we mimicked real ECOSEL games where player pools, player 382 preferences and purchasing power are beyond the operator's control. Our goal was to make the results as 383 robust as possible with respect to these anticipated heterogeneities. Our choice of experimental design 384 followed Friedman and Sunder (1994) and Croson (2005) to directly control for the treatment (design) 385 variables and to randomly control for the -nuisance‖ variables. 386
To mirror the heterogeneous preferences that people might hold with respect to ecosystem services 387 such as tons of carbon sequestered over a period time in a given forestland if alternative i is implemented 388 (X i ), and hectares of old-forest habitat that would develop over the same period of time and given the 389 same management alternative (Y i ), we created the following induced payoff function for each player k: 390
where, in addition to using the same notation, . This restriction was necessary to ensure that each subject had a positive value assigned to at 400 least one public good in each bundle of two services. Table 2 summarizes the attributes of the bundles as 401 they were presented to the subjects: we listed the assumed consequences for -carbon sequestration‖ and 402 -old-forest habitat‖ (the values of X i and Y i ), along with their threshold costs as shares of group 403 endowments. The relative costs of the bundles follow the relative opportunity costs of changing 404 management at Pack Forest. Given our definition of social surplus associated with a given bundle, that is 405 the sum of valuations ( k i v 's) that the players assign to the bundles minus the threshold cost ( i r ), the 406 welfare maximizing bundle was Bundle E for all auctions. Due to the pre-assigned heterogeneous 407 preferences, however, Bundle E was not unanimously preferred in all groups of bidders mirroring a 408 possible lack of consensus on the best forest management plan in a real ECOSEL auction. 409
To introduce income heterogeneity, each subject was endowed with either 10 or 20 EMUs with a 50% 410 chance each of getting either one for each auction. This allowed our findings to stand in the presence of 411 some income heterogeneity, a likely factor in a real auction. An additional benefit of the randomization 412 was to ensure that subjects would not be able to calculate the actual purchasing power available in the 413 room by multiplying the value of their endowment with the number of subjects (although they could 414 certainly get the minimum and a maximum estimate). This prevented coordination around simple cost-415
sharing rules, which could be observed in the lab but would not be applicable in a real-world ecosystem 416 bidding situation. 1 While the EMUs did not carry over between auctions, those units that remained in the 417 hands of the subjects and were not used for bidding could be redeemed for US$ at the end of both auction 418
series. 419
Induced values, monetary endowments and subject group assignments were generated prior to the 420 experiment. For each auction, each subject was given a different endowment and a set of induced values 421
representing his or her payoffs in EMUs assuming that the associated bundle succeeds in the auction. 422
Each subject participated in each of the four auction types (T1-T4). This involved random assignments of 423 each subject to a row (room) in each of the columns (runs) in Table 1 . No subject was assigned to the 424 same auction type twice and by shuffling the subjects in each run of the experimental auctions we avoided 425 the emergence of group-specific effects. 426
Subjects for the experimental auctions were recruited among University of Washington 427
undergraduates across a variety of disciplines. To enable the experimenters to induce subject preferences 428 that are not influenced by unobservable values that people might associate with -public goods‖, -forests‖, 429 or -ecosystem services‖, no mention of these terms was made on recruitment flyers or during the 430 experimental sessions (for detailed subject instructions, see the Appendix). Again, the purpose of this 431 investigation was to shed light on the features of the auction itself, rather than on bidder preferences. To 432 that end, we exerted experimental control over the subjects' preferences. As a result, our subject pools did 433 not have to be representative of the population of actual bidders that we might expect to participate in real 434
ECOSEL auctions. 435
We implemented two series of experimental auctions, 32 in total, using the design in Table 1 . The 436 first series was designed to have 60 subjects and the second to have 80 subjects. In reality, 54 subjects 437 participated in the first, and 68 subjects in the second series of auctions. Subjects in the first series 438 randomly drew an envelope coded 1-60 and subjects in the second series randomly drew one of the 80 439 envelopes. Each envelope contained 4 smaller envelopes directing the subject to one of the 4 rooms to 440 participate in the 4 auction types in a predetermined sequence. The small envelopes also contained the 441 subject's endowments in EMUs as well as the induced values representing their preferences for the public 442 good bundles. Subjects arriving on time were paid a bonus of US$5 and were given an introductory 443 presentation, as well as a quiz that tested their understanding of the experimental procedures (see 444
Appendix for further details). The subjects then followed their specific auction sequence with the 445 corresponding room assignments. Each auction started with a brief introduction to the auction rules. For 446 example, subjects in a T2 auction were instructed not to communicate with each other, that 5 bundles 447
were available for bidding, and that threshold costs were not disclosed. The introduction was followed by 448 the 5 bidding rounds. The subjects were informed of the total bids and whether any bundle was winning 449 after each round and they were told that Round 5 was the final round that determined the outcome of the 450 auction. In each auction, subjects were given their induced values as determined by in Eq. [1] . 451
This information was presented to the subjects highlighting the fact that payoffs were conditional on the 452 success of the associated bundles in the auction. The subjects were told that they could bid on multiple 453 bundles, provided that the sum of their bids for different bundles did not exceed their endowment. EMU 454 bids that were placed on bundles that failed to win were refunded to the subjects in full. The seller 455 provided. Across both sessions, the average earnings comprised $29.1, for approximately $8.3/hour. We 463 did not receive reports of subject fatigue and no attrition was observed. 464
Econometric analysis: 465
As the hypotheses state, we wish to measure the impacts of design variables on the efficiency of the 466 proposed mechanism as well as on the profit generated. Seller profit is simply the largest positive 467 difference between total bids and the bundle threshold cost. Profit is only obtained if the auction is 468 successful. We use relative efficiency, defined as the ratio of the social surplus of the winning bundle to 469 the maximum possible social surplus as a parsimonious measure of auction efficiency (and success). If no 470 bundle wins, the relative efficiency of the auction, along with seller profit, is zero. If the efficient bundle 471 wins, the relative efficiency is 1, and values lower than 1 are obtained if a less efficient bundle wins the 472 auction. Given that profits can only be observed in successful auctions where relative efficiency is greater 473 than 0, we developed a double-hurdle model for relative efficiency and seller profit to test the impact of 474 the design variables on the performance of the proposed mechanism. Double-hurdle models, first 475 introduced by Cragg in 1971, have been used extensively in microeconomics to study consumer behavior 476 in markets where the consumption of a good can be observed only for those individuals who have 477 selected themselves as market participants. In our case, seller profit can only be observed for successful 478 auctions, and analyzing factors influencing seller profit separately from auction efficiency may lead to 479 selectivity bias. Furthermore, relative efficiency and seller profit are also censored in the auctions as 480 relative efficiency must be between 0 and 1 and seller profit cannot be negative. To deal with the 481 selection process and variable censoring we specify the double-hurdle in terms of unobserved, or latent 482 Since the latent variable is assumed to be normally distributed, it could take on negative values and values 504 greater than 1. Thus, it is important to focus on the observable relative efficiency, using the normality of In addition to the design variables of threshold cost disclosure, the number of bundles, and subject 511 communication, several other variables were introduced in the model specification. These additional 512 variables were (1) the actual threshold cost of the bundle that maximized social surplus, (2) the actual 513 maximum achievable net per person benefit (payoff or utility), (3) an interaction term between the cost 514 disclosure variable and the maximum net benefit that was achievable in the auction, and (4) the variables 515 capturing the subject learning effects 3 . We discuss these variables one by one. 516
As presented in Table 2 , the original experimental design called for the threshold costs of the bundles 517 that maximized social surplus to be set to one half of the total group endowment. Some variation was 518 introduced in these values due to a few recruited participants not showing up for the experiment (Table 3  519 shows the actual threshold costs of the efficient bundle). We control for that variation in our model and 520 expect that higher relative thresholds reduce the relative efficiency of the auction. We emphasize that this 521 variable was not included in the profit equation (in vector z i a in Eq. 2b), as profit is realized only after a 522 threshold has been cleared. Of note is that this is the only difference between the compositions of vectors 523 w i a and z i a . The two sets of regressors are identical with respect to all the other variables.
524
The maximum achievable net benefit, averaged over the group participants, is expected to positively 525 impact relative efficiency. Being a measure of how much an individual stands to gain, on average, from 526 the success of the auction, it should have a positive impact on auction performance (Croson and Marks 527 2000). The expected impact on seller profit is ambiguous as it is not clear how the per person maximum 528 benefit affects landowner profit once its impact on the success of the auction has been accounted for. 529 Importantly, including an interaction term between the cost disclosure variable and the maximum 530 achievable net benefit in an auction provides a basis for an empirical test of McBride's (2006) result. As 531 discussed earlier, we expect threshold cost uncertainty (non-disclosure) to lead to lower relative efficiency 532 when the value of the auction, as measured by the maximum achievable net benefit, is low but to higher 533 efficiency when the value of public goods is high. Thus, we expect the coefficient on the cost disclosure 534 variable to be positive, and we expect the coefficient on the interaction term to be negative, implying a 535 critical value of a public good (i.e., the forest ecosystem services) which switches the impact of cost non-536 disclosure from negative to positive. Although McBride's (2006) model did not address the impact of the 537 value of the public good on over-contributions (i.e., seller profit), we included the interaction term in the 538 profit equation. We expect that a tradeoff exists between the bidders' desire to increase the share of the 539 net benefit they get to enjoy in case the public good is provided (a case corresponding to lower seller 540 profit) and the desire to see the high-value auction succeed. This suggests that the impacts of threshold 541 disclosure and the interaction terms should be of opposite signs in the profit equation (in vector  in Eq.
2b). 543
We added two additional variables to vectors w i a and z i a in an attempt to account for subject learning 544 effects and to see if these explain any of the variations in relative efficiency and seller profit. These extra 545 variables were the auction run number (Table 1 ) and an interaction term between the communication 546 variable and the run number. With the interaction term, we wished to capture the differential impact of 547 subject communication as they gained more experience. It is important to note that the subjects were 548 shuffled after each experimental auction to avoid group effects. Thus, the learning effects reflect only the 549 impact of the subjects' familiarity and comfort with the design of the experiments. 550
Finally, although the subjects were carefully tutored and quizzed on their understanding of the 551 experimental procedures before the actual auctions began (see Appendix), it is an accepted practice in 552 experimental economics to treat the first rounds of the experiment as a practice or -burn-in‖ runs (e.g., 553
Isaac and Walker 1988, McBride 2010). We followed this practice and excluded those auctions from the 554 sample where the run number was 1 to ensure that the subjects were fully comfortable and familiar with 555 the workings of the experiments. 556
The coefficients of the double-hurdle model (vectors  and  ) were estimated by a maximum 557 likelihood procedure using the SAS ® software's Qualitative and Limited Dependent Variable Procedure 558 (SAS Institute 2010). We discuss the estimation results and their interpretation in the next section. 559 23 560
Results and Discussion 561
We start our discussion with an overview of the overall success rate of the experimental auctions, the 562 average relative efficiency and average profit margin. A detailed analysis of the estimated impacts of our 563 design and nuisance variables on the mechanism's relative efficiency and seller profit margins follows. 564
We conclude the section by discussing the implications of the results on designing a voluntary market 565 mechanism for forest ecosystem services. We report all of the experimental data in Table 3 but shade the 566 first run auctions with grey to signify their exclusion from the analysis. 567 568
Auction success, relative efficiency and seller profit: 569
The right hand side of Table 3 shows the outcomes of each experimental auction: the winning 570 bundles, along with their threshold costs, the realized net benefits, the relative efficiencies and the seller's 571 profit margins. Of the 24 experimental auctions (excluding the first auctions), the proposed mechanism 572 succeeded, that is, a public good was provided in 16 trials. This corresponds to a success rate of 66.7%, 573 which is quite high and is in line with findings from earlier research on similar provision point 574 As expected from theoretical analyses of subscription games of incomplete information, ECOSEL 577 auctions were not fully efficient. Average relative efficiency, which was measured as the ratio of realized 578 net benefits and the maximum possible net benefit, was observed to be 54.05% across the 24 experimental 579 trials, and 81.07% in auctions ending with a public good being provided. Among the successful auctions, 580 the theoretical welfare maximum, i.e., the maximum achievable net benefit, was obtained in 3 out of 16 581 trials (18.75%). With the exception of a single experimental auction, all auctions ending with the 582 provision of a public good generated a positive profit for the seller, with an average 11.32% margin. This 583 profit margin was 7.55% if all the experimental auctions, including the ones that were unsuccessful, are 584 considered. This represents the ex-ante, unconditional, profit expectation for the potential seller of 585 ecosystem services. This result is encouraging in the sense that ECOSEL needs to be able to offer a 586 24 chance for significant profit to maximize forest landowner buy-in, thereby putting the mechanism in a 587 distinct advantage over other voluntary instruments such as forest certification. 588
589
The impact of design and nuisance variables: 590 Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of the design and nuisance variable coefficients of the 591 double-hurdle model [2] [3] [4] . Of the three design variables, communication and the threshold cost 592 disclosure variables have a significant (<10% level of significance) impact on relative efficiency of the 593 auction (Table 4 ). In terms of seller profit, the number of bundles and threshold cost disclosure variable 594 had a significant impact. The former affected the profit positively, whereas the latter negatively. The 595 auction run number was significant in the relative efficiency equation, and the interaction term between 596 the run number and the communication variable failed to produce a significant effect on either efficiency 597 or profit. This suggests that subject learning has a positive impact on the success of the auction, but that 598 effect is not related to better communication among subjects. Next, we discuss whether our hypotheses 599 can be corroborated or rejected based on the results of the econometric model. 600
Hypotheses H1E and H1R dealt with the impact of the number of bundles presented to the subjects. 601
While no significant impact is observed in terms of relative efficiency, presenting three as opposed to five 602 bundles was found to increase seller profit by 3.5 EMUs (12 percentage point increase in the profit 603 margin), all other things being equal, and where the computation of the marginal impacts takes into 604 account nonlinearities due to dependent variable censoring 4 . This impact, which is positive and 605 statistically significant at the 5% level of significance, can be attributed to a smaller extent of the 606 coordination problem. 607
Our hypotheses with respect to threshold cost disclosure (H2E, and H2R) are tested by observing the 608 coefficients on the cost disclosure variable and the interaction term between cost disclosure and the 609 maximum achievable net benefit from an auction. Our hypothesis H2E is corroborated: we observe a 610 positive and significant impact of cost disclosure dummy on relative efficiency, while McBride's (2006) 611 result finds empirical support, as the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant. In our 612 sample, the marginal impact of cost disclosure is a ~ 4.35% addition to relative efficiency. As discussed 613 below, the model implies a critical value of the public good when non-disclosure becomes beneficial to 614 relative efficiency. In designing a real auction, this implies that we ought to take into account the value of 615 the ecosystem services being offered. If we expect the bundle to be valued highly by the potential bidders, 616
then not disclosing the costs may be warranted on efficiency grounds. 617
Hypothesis H2R is corroborated as well: all things being equal, disclosing the threshold costs leads to 618 lower seller profit. However, this effect is mitigated by the value of the auction to the bidders, and a high 619 enough maximum net benefit from an auction could lead to a positive impact on seller profit from cost 620 disclosure. On net, in our sample, the marginal impact of disclosure is 2.6 EMU (10 percentage point) 621 reduction in seller profit. 622
The effect of non-binding communication is also consistent with our hypotheses (H3E and H3R): 623 communication is estimated to have a persistent (non-diminishing with auction runs, as evidenced by the 624 lack of significance of the communication/auction run interaction) positive impact on relative efficiency. 625
We expected that the possibility of communication between subjects may reduce free-riding and reduce 626 the coordination problem, as subjects were free to announce their preferred bundle of public goods or 627 their intended bids (although the subjects were prohibited from disclosing their values or endowments or 628 harassing other subjects in any fashion). Allowing subject communication has a large marginal impact of 629 increasing relative efficiency of the experimental auction: 83%. The induced heterogeneity in subject 630 valuations of the public goods bundles does not appear to undermine the effectiveness of communication. 631
We do not disentangle the effect of communication on reducing free-riding from its impact on reducing 632 the coordination problem, as our fractional factorial experimental design does not allow for separate 633 estimation of the communication/number of bundles interaction. From the perspective of using the 634 experimental results as a testbed for a forest ecosystem market, it is ultimately the net impact of 635 communication that is of interest. 636
26
The effect of communication on seller profit is negative (as expected), but not significant. Our results 637 are consistent with earlier studies (Krishnamurthy 2001) , and provide empirical support to the positive 638 postulated impact of communication on the efficiency of contribution games posited by Agastya et al. 639 (2007) . 640
As expected, the higher relative threshold of the efficient bundle, the lower the relative efficiency of 641 the experimental auction. The maximum net benefit from the efficient bundle, averaged over the group 642 participants, is found to positively impact the relative efficiency of the auction, and to have no significant 643 impact on seller profit. 644
Finally, we note that the correlation in unobservables,  was not found to be significant under the 645 two-sided test of the null hypothesis. That said, our expectation is that this correlation may be positive if 646 the unobservable characteristics leading to a more efficient auction are positively related to unobservable 647 characteristics influencing profit (e.g., some -bidding spirit‖ not captured by the model). We find some 648 empirical support for this expectation: the one-sided hypothesis test of  being non-negative has a p-649 value of 0.099, allowing us to claim that  is non-negative at 10% level of significance 5 . This suggests 650 that ignoring the selection process in unobservables would lead to biased estimates, and joint modeling of 651 relative efficiency and seller profit is appropriate. 652 653
Design implications: 654
Given that our practical interest lies in using the experimental results for the design and 655 administration of a real auction for forest ecosystem services, we analyze the predicted impact of the 656 design variables in terms of both relative efficiency and seller profit. We explore whether some auction 657 designs could be deemed to be superior or inferior along these two dimensions. In particular, we are 658 looking for designs which would be Pareto-efficient (non-dominated) in efficiency-profit space. 659
Conceptually, there can be several designs which would trade off the expected efficiency of the 660 mechanism with the seller profit, conditional on the auction successfully providing a public good. Also, 661 many designs could be discarded if they were shown to be inferior (dominated) by others. We do find a 662 27 potential for such tradeoffs and for eliminating some auction designs in our experimental results. Of the 663 three design variables, communication was found to be positively influencing relative efficiency without a 664 significant impact on seller profit, and a low number of bundles was found to positively affect profit 665 without a significant impact on relative efficiency. This immediately leads to auction designs involving 666 communication and low number of bundles dominating other design options. Communication can be 667 supported within the ECOSEL website by an internal messaging system where the bidders can contact 668 each other with or without disclosing their identity. Links to social media can encourage players to build 669 and nurture their causes towards forest services and establish larger coalitions for bidding. The result that 670 a low number of bundles increase seller profit, highlights the importance of careful pre-auction planning 671
for the forest landowner. The select management plans/bundles must be maximally representative of the 672 dominant views of the known stakeholders. For auctions that involve large and valuable forest assets, this 673 might mean that stated preference surveys might have to be done by the landowner prior to the auction. 674
Unlike communication and the number of bundles, the effect of cost disclosure on both efficiency 675 and profit depends on the value of the public good available in an auction. Our experimental results allow 676 us to identify a range of public good values where not disclosing the threshold costs is the preferred 677 design from both the efficiency and profit standpoints. To see how this range can be derived, let 678     for the experimental auctions, a threshold cost disclosure policy leads to higher relative efficiency but to 711 lower seller profit. 712
In sum, our analysis suggests that design decisions have to take into account information on the likely 713 magnitude of the net benefit forthcoming from the success of the auction. If the value of public goods 714
presented is likely to be high, then the auction administrator faces a tradeoff between profit and 715 efficiency. If efficiency is deemed relatively more important, threshold costs should not be disclosed to 716 the bidders. On the other hand, if the auctions do not offer public goods of substantial value, then 717 disclosing the threshold costs is likely to lead to better efficiency. This suggests that valuation exercises 718 might need to precede the ecosystem services auctions to estimate the per person values potential bidders 719 place on different bundles of ecosystem services. 720
Of course, caveats are in order before these results can be applied to real ecosystem services auctions. 721
First, in our experiments, subjects are committed to participating in some kind of an auction before they 722 see the specific design. In the real world, potential bidders may find it objectionable to even sign up for an 723 auction where the cost of the bundle of ecosystem services is not disclosed. In a sense, this is an extensive 724 margin consideration, versus the impact of cost disclosure on the intensive margin once the auction is 725 underway. Second, subjects in an experimental session had a limited number of bidding rounds to 726 discover the approximate magnitude of the threshold costs. Depending on the design of the real auction, 727 bidders could adjust their non-committal bids before the auction ends in order to bracket the threshold 728 cost of one or several bundles quite closely. Preventing such behavior, by limiting the number of bids a 729 participant can submit for example, could make the auction too complex. 730
Finally, we considered the effects of variables related to how affordable the public good is relative to 731 the group budget, as well as the magnitude of the potential social surplus. We found that both of these 732 variables positively impact the likelihood of public good provision and the relative efficiency of 733 mechanism. In the real world, this clearly relates to the cost of providing forest ecosystem services and to 734 the public's willingness to pay for such benefits. We hope that emphasizing the cost-efficiency of the 735 presented bundles of ecosystem services, via multi-objective optimization, can improve the 736 communication of costs to the public and make the bundles more attractive compared to contributions 737 where the conservation investments may not be optimally spent. 738 739
Conclusions 740
In this article, we studied the design of a voluntary market mechanism for forest ecosystem services, 741 called ECOSEL. ECOSEL is a subscription game that has been shown to have promising properties with 742 respect to many of the critical issues that arise in the context of public good markets, such as additionality 743 or free-riding (Tóth et al. 2010 ). Using analytical techniques from experimental economics, we tested the 744 effects of select design variables in ECOSEL on the ability of the mechanism to both increase the 745 provision of ecosystem services to society and to provide the landowners who produce these services with 746 a profit. We restricted our analysis to three design choices: (1) whether or not communication among 747 ECOSEL market participants should be allowed, (2) whether a lower or a higher number of alternative 748 management plans should be offered for bidding, and (3) whether the reserve prices (or threshold costs) 749 of these plans should be disclosed to the bidders. Our results indicate that subject communication 750 positively affects the relative efficiency of the mechanism without significant impact on seller profit. 751
Non-binding communication may alleviate the problem of free riding by creating an implicit social norm 752 of contribution, as well as alleviating the coordination problem due to existence of multiple bundles of 753 public goods. A practical implication of this finding is that the bidders should be given access to a variety 754 of communication channels including messaging boards internal to the ECOSEL website and links to 755 social media where causes for forest and biodiversity conservation can be built and nurtured in 756 conjunction with specific auctions. 757
Presenting fewer public goods to the bidders has a positive impact on seller profit, perhaps due to a 758 smaller extent of the coordination problem, and has no significant impact on auction efficiency. This 759 result suggests that potential sellers of forest ecosystem services must be careful as they select alternative 760 plans for an ECOSEL auction. They need to manage the tradeoff between the risk of losing bidders with 761 too few options and the reward of converging bids by selecting a small set of solutions that are broadly 762 representative of the potentials of the resource. 763
31
The impact of disclosing the threshold costs was found to be consistent with theoretical results 764 (McBride 2006) and has important implications for the design of real-world voluntary forest ecosystem 765 markets. In particular, our results imply that a critical value of the public good exists where the non-766 disclosure of threshold costs becomes beneficial to the mechanism's relative efficiency. This suggests 767 that, in designing a real world application of a subscription game like ECOSEL, we ought to take into 768 account the value of the bundle of ecosystem services that are being offered. If we expect the bundle to be 769 valued highly by the potential bidders, then not disclosing the costs may be warranted on efficiency 770 grounds. However, high-value auctions perform better in generating seller profit when threshold costs are 771 disclosed. We also found that there was a range of net expected auction benefits, where threshold cost 772 disclosure may dominate other auction designs in terms of both the efficiency and the profit criteria. 773
The three design variables that we tested in this study are not the only ones that should be considered. other players' bids disclosed to the bidders, and the features of the auction interface are also likely to be 777 relevant for the design of a voluntary market. We leave the study of these options for future work. 778
As a final note, we argue that by bringing some ideas from the theory of voluntary public good 779 provision to the forefront of forest science, we encourage the community to take a serious look at 780 voluntary mechanisms for funding forest ecosystem services. We believe that voluntary markets such as 781 ECOSEL have the potential to play an important complementary role in promoting non-timber forest 782 goods. This article shows how the design of such mechanisms can be studied in a rigorous manner. More 783 generally, this work also contributes to the understanding of a class of public goods subscription games 784 that is more general in structure than what have previously been studied in the literature. and old-forest habitat area of the bundles developed for Pack Forest, and threshold costs 943 (reserve prices) were based on foregone revenue and scaled to the total endowments that were 944 assigned to each group. 945 Table 3 . Experimental auction attributes and outcomes. The total endowments, the max total benefits and 946 the max net benefits were adjusted to the number of subjects who participated in the tests. 947
Relative efficiency was calculated as a ratio (%) of realized net benefit and the maximum 948 attainable net benefit. In binary design vector (c, b, d), c=1 if communication is allowed, 0 949 otherwise, b=1 if 3 bundles are used, 0 otherwise and d=1 if threshold cost is disclosed, 0 950 otherwise). 951 Table 4 . Econometric estimates of impacts on auction relative efficiency and seller profit. 
Appendix: Experimental Protocol

Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this experiment conducted by University of Washington researchers. This project provides an opportunity to earn a considerable amount of money, but only if you are careful to follow directions, make good decisions, and pay attention to the decisions that others are making. Therefore, it is important for you (and for our research!) that you take your time to understand the instructions. These instructions are your private information. Please do not communicate with the other participants unless expressly encouraged to do so. If you have any questions, please ask us.
Throughout the experiment we will use Experimental Monetary Units (EMUs) rather than U.S. dollars. At the end of the experiment your EMU earnings will be converted to U.S. dollars at an exchange rate of 1 EMU = 0.25 U.S. dollars (25 cents).
You have picked an envelope containing a randomly assigned sequence of experiments that you will participate in. A computer randomly generated that sequence, and it is important that you follow your own instructions for the duration of the experiment. We have 4 different classrooms where experiments are conducted simultaneously. Your envelope contains your individual sequence of classrooms. Please move to the classroom indicated when we ask you.
Your task
The experiment consists of you participating in a series of mock auctions. Each auction will last for 5 bidding rounds. At the beginning of each auction, you will be given a randomly assigned amount of EMUs.
We will refer to that amount as your "endowment". Your EMUs do not carry over between auctions: that is, you cannot use the EMUs you used in one room in another room. You are assigned EMUs in each experiment and it is important to remember that each auction is a new research trial. However, your EMUs accumulate, and at the end of the experiment you will be paid (total EMUs accumulated/4) dollars. Therefore you should seek to maximize your EMUs in each auction.
In each auction, you and other participants in your room will be presented with a number of 'projects'. Each project has a threshold cost associated with it. If the sum of participants' bids exceeds the project threshold cost, the project will "win" and you will earn the amount of EMUs indicated on your instructions sheet. Your earnings represent the "value" you place on the project. Only one project can "win". If contributions to more than one project exceed the threshold cost, for the project for which contribution exceed the cost by the largest amount, wins. Contributions in excess of the threshold cost are kept by the experimenter.
You can bid for multiple projects. Exact bidding rules will be explained to you once you are ready to begin actual bidding. If a project does not "win", you do not have to actually pay your bid. However, if the project you bid for "wins", you MUST surrender the EMUs you bid on that project. If no project accumulates enough bids to cover its cost, you get to keep your endowment, but you earn no additional money.
hand and we will come to your assistance. After each round of bidding, we will tell you the total bids for each project. After the last round of bidding, if you bid any amount on the winning project, please place those EMUs in an envelope and return them to us.
Auction T2: No Communication, 5 Projects, No Costs Disclosed
Script: You will now participate in an auction, where we will ask you for the bids you wish to place on projects A,B,C,D, or E. Please open the envelope for this auction [insert run number]. You are given an endowment of EMUs for this auction. You have 5 bid sheets, one for each round of bidding. On the bid sheets, we tell you how many EMUs you will earn if a particular project "wins". Your endowment and earnings is private information! DO NOT SHARE IT WITH ANY ONE! Please do not communicate in any way with other participants in the room! If you have a question, please raise your hand and we will come to your assistance. After each round, we will simply tell you whether the total bids for the project are higher or lower than the threshold cost. You will not know the threshold cost exactly. After the last round of bidding, if you bid any amount on the winning project, please place those EMUs in an envelope and return them to us.
Auction T3: Communication, 3 Projects, No Costs Disclosed
Script: You will now participate in an auction, where we will ask you for the bids you wish to place on projects A,B, or C. Please open the envelope for this auction [insert run number]. You You are given an endowment of EMUs for this auction. have 5 bid sheets, one for each round of bidding. On the bid sheets, we tell you how many EMUs you will earn if a particular project "wins". Your endowment and earnings is private information! HOWEVER, YOU MAY DISCUSS YOUR BIDDING STRATEGY WITH OTHERS. EXPERIMENTER MAY STOP ALL COMMUNICATION IF DEEMED NECESSARY. If you have a question, please still raise your hand and we will come to your assistance. After each round, we will simply tell you whether the total bids for the project are higher or lower than the threshold cost. You will not know the threshold cost exactly. After the last round of bidding, if you bid any amount on the winning project, please place those EMUs in an envelope and return them to us.
Auction T4: Communication, 5 Projects, Costs disclosed
Script: You will now participate in an auction, where we will ask you for the bids you wish to place on projects A,B,C,D, or E. Please open the envelope for this auction [insert run number]. You are given an endowment of EMUs for this auction. You have 5 bid sheets, one for each round of bidding. On the bid sheets, we tell you how much each project needs to accumulate in contributions in order to have a potential to "win". On the bid sheets, we tell you how many EMUs you will earn if a particular project "wins". Your endowment and earnings is private information! HOWEVER, YOU MAY DISCUSS YOUR BIDDING STRATEGY WITH OTHERS. EXPERIMENTER MAY STOP ALL COMMUNICATION IF DEEMED NECESSARY. If you have a question, please still raise your hand and we will come to your assistance. After each round of bidding, we will tell you the total bids for each project. After the last round of bidding, if you bid any amount on the winning project, please place those EMUs in an envelope and return them to us.
